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ABSTRACT
Dynamic games in which each player has an exponential cost criterion are referred to as risk-sensitive
dynamic games. In this paper, Nash equilibra are considered for such games. Feedback risk-sensitive
Nash equilibrium solutions are derived for two-person discrete-time linear-quadratic nonzero-sum
games, both under complete state observation and shared partial observation.
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1 Introduction
This paper studies discrete-time dynamic games where each player has an exponential-of-integral
cost criterion. For short, the latter game is referred to as a risk-sensitive dynamic game. Risk-sensitive
control is well studied in literature as an extension of classical control. The study of this extension to
dynamic games seems to be new. As result of this, we develop Nash equilibrium solutions both under
complete observation and shared partial observation.
Linear-Exponential-Gaussian (LEG) control has been introduced in the early 1970’s [1], [2]. In Ja-
cobson [1], LEG control for discrete time with perfect state observation is treated. Jacobson also
showed an equivalence of the optimal LEG control with the solutions of deterministic (cooperative
and noncooperative) zero-sum quadratic games. In Speyer et al. [2], LEG control for discrete time
with partial state observation is treated. For the case with costs only on the terminal state, it turned out
that the feedback control law is a linear function of the current state. For general linear-exponential-
quadratic-Gaussian (LEQG) control with costs on the intermediate states, [2] also obtained an optimal
controller which is a linear function of the smoothed estimate of the entire state history.
Subsequently, Whittle [3] and [4], completed these results and characterized the solution in terms of
a certainty equivalence principle. It was Whittle too who introduced the name risk-sensitive LQG
control. Whittle assumes that the control at the current time is a function of the observation history
up to the previous time, and obtained the solution for general LEQG control for discrete time with
partial state observation. Jaensch and Speyer [5] and Fan et al. [6] extend the results of Whittle for
the slightly more natural assumption that the control at the current time is a function of the observation
history up to the current time.
LEQG control in continuous time was treated by Bensoussan and Van Schuppen, [7] for the par-
tially observable case. Bensoussan [8] gives a good characterization of both the complete and partial
observation cases.
In James et al. [9] finite horizon partially observed risk-sensitive stochastic control for discrete-time
for nonlinear systems was considered. As in Whittle [3] and [4], they consider control with one-
step-delayed observation. Their approach was motivated by the method used by Bensoussan and Van
Schuppen [7] and the well-known separation method for risk-neutral control.
Collings et al. [10] present the output feedback discrete-time risk-sensitive LQG control solution de-
rived via the methods in [7], [9], with a one-step delayed observation. With these methods, the solution
is obtained without appealing to a certainty equivalence principle. In James and Baras [11], new re-
sults are presented concerning the certainty equivalence principle under certain standard assumptions.
In this paper, we go beyond LEQG control by considering discrete-time Nash equilibrium solutions
in dynamic games with exponential cost criteria. For dynamic games without exponential cost cri-
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teria, i.e. the risk-neutral case, we refer to Bas¸ar and Olsder [12]. The risk-sensitive dynamic game
problem is formulated in Section 2 for the special case of a two-person linear-quadratic nonzero-sum
game. In this section, also the definition of a risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium is given. In Section 3,
two theorems for the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution are derived, one for the com-
plete state observation case and one for the shared partial observation case. The derivation leading
to these these theorems is mainly based on the results of the book of Bas¸ar and Olsder [12] on the
theory of noncooperative dynamic games, and the detailed proofs of Whittle [3] Jaensch and Speyer
[5] and Fan et al. [6] on risk-sensitive control. In Section 4, both theorems are applied to a two-person
linear-quadratic nonzero-sum game. First, the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution in
the complete observable case is derived. Next, it is shown that the feedback Nash equilibrium solu-
tion in the shared partial observable case can be constructed from the feedback risk-sensitive Nash
equilibrium design and two risk-modified Kalman filters.
An earlier version of this paper has been presented at the 1995 ACC [13].
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2 Problem formulation
We will consider a two-person discrete-time linear-quadratic dynamic game with exponential cost
criteria. The system model is described by
xk+1 = Akxk +B1ku
1
k +B
2
ku
2
k + wk (1)
where xk ∈ Rn, uik ∈ Rmi , and wk ∈ Rl. The measurement model is
zk = Hkxk + vk (2)
where zk ∈ Rp and vk ∈ Rp. The random variable x0 is normally distributed with mean xˆ0 and with
covariance matrix P0, the processes {wk} and {vk} are assumed to be zero-mean, jointly Gaussian,
independent random variables for all k = 0, 1, . . . , N with known covariance matrices Qwk > 0 and
Rvk > 0, respectively.
Cost functional for player i is given by
J i(θi) = E
{−θi exp(−θiΨi0)} (3)
where the random cost Ψi0 are
Ψi0 =
1
2
x′NQ
i
NxN +
1
2
N−1∑
k=0
(x′kQ
i
kxk + u
i′
kR
ii
k u
i
k + u
j′
k R
ij
k u
j
k). (4)
It is assumed that all matrices are of appropriate dimensions, Qik are symmetric and Qik ≥ 0 for
k = 0, 1, . . . , N and Riik > 0 for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1. The parameters θi are some scalar constants
(positive or negative) which can be characterized as the risk-sensitivity parameter; they measure the
optimizers’ sensitivity to risk. If θi is positive, then player i behaves as if unobservables would take
values in his advantage, which is an optimistic attitude (i.e., risk-seeking). If θi is negative, then player
i behaves as if unobservables would take values in his disadvantage, which is a pessimistic attitude
(i.e., risk-averse). It is assumed that the players have different risk-sensitivity parameters.
The objective of both players is to minimize their cost function over the class of control laws. It
is assumed that both players know the state as well as the cost functions. During the evolution of
the game it is assumed that both players have the same information on the (either fully or partially
observed) state and know each other’s control function up to the previous time. The information space
Wk of both players is the same at stage k and is defined as
Wk =
{
x0, x1, . . . , xk; ui0, u
i
1, . . . , u
i
k−1; i = 1, 2; k
}
for complete state observation, and
Wk =
{
z0, z1, . . . , zk; ui0, u
i
1, . . . , u
i
k−1; i = 1, 2; k
}
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for shared partial state observation.
The available information ηik is a subset of the information space Wk. The strategy γik maps the
available information ηik into the control, that is γik(·) : Wk → Rmi , so that uik = γik(ηik). For given
values of θ1 and θ2, an admissible strategy pair (γ1
∗
, γ2
∗
) constitutes a risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium
solution if the following inequalities are satisfied for γi ∈ Γi, i = 1, 2
J1
∗ ∆= J1(γ1
∗
, γ2
∗
; θ1) ≤ J1(γ1, γ2∗ ; θ1)
J2
∗ ∆= J2(γ1
∗
, γ2
∗
; θ2) ≤ J2(γ1∗ , γ2 ; θ2)
where γi ∆=
(
γi0, γ
i
1, γ
i
2, . . . , γ
i
N−1
)
. The problem is to determine the feedback risk-sensitive Nash
equilibrium. Therefore it is assumed that the available information of player i for the complete state
observation case is ηik = {xk} and for the shared partial state observation case this is ηik = {zk}. In
this paper, the Nash equilibrium solution is characterized for both the complete and the shared partial
observation case.
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3 Risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium strategies
In this section two theorems are derived for feedback Nash equilibrium solutions in risk-sensitive
dynamic games, one for complete state observation and one for shared partial observation.
First the following proposition for the risk-sensitive dynamic game problem is derived, a similar
result for risk-sensitive optimal control was given in Whittle [3, Theorem 1], Jaensch and Speyer [5,
Theorem 3.1], and Fan et al. [6, Theorem 3.1].
Proposition 1 Let Si = Ψi0 + θ−1i ΨD, where
ΨD = 12 (x0 − xˆ0)′P−10 (x0 − xˆ0) + 12 v′0(Rv0)−1v0
+12
N−1∑
k=0
{
w′k(Q
w
k )
−1wk + v′k+1(R
v
k+1)
−1vk+1
}
.
(5)
If for i = 1, 2 the function Si is minimized with respect to uik, . . . , uiN−1 and extremized with respect
to x0, . . . , xN and zk+1, . . . , zN for a given value ofWk, where the order of optimization is irrelevant
and the infima and extrema are attained and denoted by the value (u1∗k , u2
∗
k ), then the strategy pair
(or control law) at stage k defined by (γ1∗k , γ2∗k ) is the risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium at stage k.
Proof: In order to find the risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution for the problem with cost-
functionals of exponential-quadratic form as given in (3), it is shown in [14, Appendix], that the prob-
lem reduces to one in which for each player a Dynamic Programming recursion must to be solved.
The Dynamic Programming recursion for player i, a recursion in terms of Φik(Wk), is given as
Φik(Wk) = min
uik
ext
zk+1
Φik+1(Wk+1) (6)
with boundary condition1
ΦiN (WN ) = extx0...xN
(
Ψi0 + θ
−1
i ΨD
)
. (7)
Here, we use the term θi-extremizing, abbreviated as “ext”, to denote an operation in which one
minimizes when θi ≥ 0 and maximizes when θi < 0.
It turns out that for every ith player recursion (6), in which we also have to take into account possible
dependence of ui∗k on xk, must be satisfied. The minimizing control is denoted by ui
∗
k . The recursion
means that for every ith player the following equation in which (ujk, . . . , u
j
N−1) = (γ
j∗
k , . . . , γ
j∗
N−1)
is substituted, must be solved
1Ψi0 + θ
−1
i ΨD is a function of x0 . . . xN , u
i
0 . . . u
i
N−1, u
j
0 . . . u
j
N−1 and z0 . . . zN .
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Φik(Wk) = min
UN−1i,k
ext
ZNk+1
ext
XN
(
Ψi0 + θ
−1
i ΨD
)
. (8)
In general, here we use the notation Xk = (x0, x1, . . . , xk), XNk = (xk, xk+1, . . . , xN ) and U
N−1
i,k =(
uik, u
i
k+1, . . . , u
i
N−1
)
, with a similar convention for other variables.
Thus, the function Ψi0 + θ
−1
i ΨD is minimized with respect to the decisions of player i currently
unmade and θi-extremized with respect to all quantities currently unobservable.
3.1 Decomposition
The recursion equation (8) can be decomposed into a forward recursion P ik and a backward recursion
F ik. Together with Proposition 1, this results in two theorems as stated below. First, the decomposition
itself is shown.
At stage k, the observation zk is available and decision uik has not yet been taken. The past function for
the ith player at k is a function of z0, . . . , zk; ui0, . . . , uik−1. The future function for the ith player at
k is a function of zk+1, . . . , zN ; uik, . . . , uiN−1. According to Proposition 1 the order of optimization
is irrelevant and thus the decomposition of (8) yields
Φik(Wk) = extxk
{
P ik(xk,Wk) + F ik(xk)
} (9)
where the functions P ik(xk,Wk) and F ik(xk) are given below.
The past function P ik(xk,Wk) of player i at stage k is defined as
P ik(xk,Wk)
∆= ext
Xk−1
[
1
2 θ
−1
i (x0 − xˆ0)′
(
W˜ i0
)−1
(x0 − xˆ0)
+
1
2
θ−1i v
′
0 (R
v
0)
−1v0 +
1
2
k−1∑
j=0
{
gij
(
xj , u
i
j , u
l
j
)
+ θ−1i
(
nj
(
xj+1, u
i
j , u
l
j , xj
)
+mj+1(zj+1, xj+1)
)}]
.
(10)
The future function F ik(xk) of player i at stage k is defined as
F ik(xk)
∆= min
UN−1i,k
ext
XNk+1
ext
ZNk+1
[
1
2
x′NQNxN+
1
2
N∑
j=k+1
θ−1i mj(zj , xj)
+
1
2
N−1∑
j=k
{
gij
(
xj , u
i
j , u
l
j
)
+ θ−1i nj
(
xj+1, u
i
j , u
l
j , xj
)}]
= min
UN−1i,k
ext
XNk+1

1
2
x′NQNxN +
1
2
N−1∑
j=k
{
gij
(
xj , u
i
j , u
l
j
)
+θ−1i nj
(
xj+1, u
i
j , u
l
j , xj
)}]
(11)
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with
gik
(
xk, u
i
k, u
j
k
) ∆= x′kQikxk + ui′kRiik uik + uj′k Rijk ujk
mk(zk, xk)
∆= (zk −Hkxk)′ (Rvk)−1 (zk −Hkxk)
and
nk
(
xk+1, u
i
k, u
j
k, xk
) ∆= (xk+1 −Akxk −Bikuik −Bjkujk)′
× (Qwk )−1
(
xk+1 −Akxk −Bikuik −Bjkujk
)
for i = 1, 2 and j = i.
It follows immediately that P ik(xk,Wk) satisfies the following forward recursion
P ik+1(xk+1,Wk+1) = extxk
[
P ik(xk,Wk) +
1
2
gik
(
xk, u
i
k, u
j
k
)
+
+
1
2θi
(
nk
(
xk+1, u
i
k, u
j
k, xk
)
+mk+1(zk, xk)
)] (12)
with initial condition
P i0(x0,W0) =
1
2θi
(x0 − xˆ0)′P−10 (x0 − xˆ0) +
1
2θi
v′0 (R
v
0)
−1v0.
Similarly, the function F ik(xk) satisfies the following backward recursion
F ik(xk) = min
uik
ext
xk+1
[
F ik+1(xk+1) +
1
2
{
gik
(
xk, u
i
k, u
j
k
)
+θ−1i nk
(
xk+1, u
i
k, u
j
k, xk
)}] (13)
with terminal condition F iN (xN ) = 12x
′
NQ
i
NxN .
The following two theorems follow directly from the discussion on the dynamic programming recur-
sion (8) and on the decomposition of function Si. The theorems concern the recursions needed to
determine feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibria. For the complete observation case, we have the
following theorem.
Theorem 1
Let ui∗k be the minimizing value of uik in the recursion equation F ik(xk) for i = 1, 2, then the
feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium at stage k for the complete observable case is given by(
γ1
∗
k (xk), γ
2∗
k (xk)
)
.
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For the shared partial observation case, we have the following theorem which is in fact an alternative
form of Proposition 1.
Theorem 2
Let ui∗k be the minimizing value of uik in the recursion equation F ik(xk) for i = 1, 2, and let vector
x˘ik be the value of xk extremizing P ik(xk,Wk) + F ik(xk). Then, the feedback risk-sensitive Nash
equilibrium at stage k for the partially observable case is given by (γ1∗k (x˘1k), γ2∗k (x˘2k)).
This theorem is in fact an extension of [5, Theorem 3.2], in which only one player is considered.
Proof: Both theorems follow directly from the discussion on the dynamic programming recur-
sion (8) and on the decomposition of function Si, see (9)-(11). If the state is completely observable,
then the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution is
(
γ1
∗
k (xk), γ
2∗
k (xk)
)
and is determined
from the backward recursions F ik(xk) for i = 1, 2 in (13). See also [12, Theorem 6.6] in which the
risk-neutral case is considered. The feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution for the case of
shared partial observation is obtained by replacing xk by x˘ik, where x˘ik is the value of xk extremizing
P ik(xk,Wk) + F ik(xk). Theorem 2 is, in fact, an extension of, Theorem 3.2 in [5] and [6] where only
one player (optimal control problem) is considered.
Both theorems are applied to the two-person linear-exponential-quadratic dynamic game as formu-
lated in Section 2, the results of which are presented in the following section.
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4 Evaluation of forward and backward recursions
In this section, first the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solutions for the complete obser-
vation case is determined from the backward recursions F ik(xk) for i = 1, 2, see Corollary 1 in
Section 4.1. Next, the forward recursions P ik(xk,Wk) for i = 1, 2 are evaluated and finally the feed-
back risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solutions for the shared partial observation case is determined,
see Corollary 2 in Section 4.2.
4.1 Complete observable risk-sensitive dynamic game
The LEQ dynamic game solution follows as a special case of Theorem 1. First some preliminary
notation for Corollary 1 is given. Define
(
M ik
)−1 = (M˜ ik)−1 + θiQwk . (14)
Let N ik (i = 1, 2, k = 0, 1, . . . , N) be appropriate dimensional matrices satisfying the set of linear
matrix equations
(
R11k +B
1′
k M
1
k+1B
1
k
)
N1k +B
1′
k M
1
k+1B
2
kN
2
k = B
1′
k M
1
k+1Ak (15)
(
R22k +B
2′
k M
2
k+1B
2
k
)
N2k +B
2′
k M
2
k+1B
1
kN
1
k = B
2′
k M
2
k+1Ak (16)
where the matrices M˜ ik are obtained recursively from
M˜1k = F
′
kM
1
k+1Fk +N
1′
k R
11
k N
1
k +N
2′
k R
12
k N
2
k +Q
1
k (17)
M˜2k = F
′
kM
2
k+1Fk +N
2′
k R
22
k N
2
k +N
1′
k R
21
k N
1
k +Q
2
k (18)
with boundary conditions M˜1N = Q1N and M˜2N = Q2N and with
Fk = Ak −B1kN1k −B2kN2k . (19)
The feedback Nash equilibrium solution for the complete observation case is fully determined by the
recursions for future functions of both players. The future function for player i is quadratic in the state
variable
F ik(xk) =
1
2
x′kM˜
i
kxk. (20)
If θi < 0, then it is necessary that M˜ il + (θiQwk )−1 < 0 for l > k.
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Corollary 1 The two-person linear-exponential-quadratic dynamic game with Qik ≥ 0 and Rijk ≥ 0
(j = i), admits a unique feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution, if and only if, (15)-(16)
admits a unique solution set
{
N ik; i = 1, 2, k = 0, 1, . . . , N
}
, in which case the equilibrium strategies
are linear in the state variable
γi
∗
k (xk) = −N ikxk. (21)
For a proof the backwards recursive equations (13) are solved here for k = N,N − 1, . . . , 0. This
goes similar as in the proof of [12, Corollary 6.1].
Remark 1: The nonnegative definiteness requirements imposed on Qik and R
ij
k are sufficient condi-
tions so that the future functions (13) are strictly convex and can be minimized, but they are by no
means necessary. Less stringent conditions for which the statement in Corollary 1 is still true is that
Riik +B
i′
kM
i
k+1B
i
k > 0, i = 1, 2, k = 0, 1, . . . , N.
Furthermore, if the set of equations (15) and (16) admits more than one set of solutions, every such
set constitutes a feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution. See also [12, Remark 6.4].
Remark 2: A precise condition for which the set of equations (15) and (16) admits a unique solution
is the invertibility for each k = 0, 1, . . . , N of the matrix in which the iith block is given by Riik +
Bi
′
kM
i
k+1B
i
k and the ijth block by Bi
′
kM
i
k+1B
j
k, where i, j = 1, 2, j = i. See also [12, Remark 6.5].
4.2 Partially observable risk-sensitive dynamic game
The partially observable LEQ dynamic game solution follows as a special case of Theorem 2. First
some preliminary notation for Corollary 2 is given. Let the vectors xˆik satisfy risk-modified Kalman
filter recursion equations
xˆik+1 = Akxˆ
i
k +B
1
ku
1
k +B
2
ku
2
k
+Ak
[(
W˜ ik
)−1 +H ′k(Rvk)−1Hk + θiQik
]−1
·{H ′k(Rvk)−1(zk −Hkxˆik)− θiQikxˆik}
(22)
with initial condition xˆi0 = xˆ0.
The matrices W˜ ik satisfy the set of forward matrix Riccati equations
W˜ ik+1 = Ak
[(
W˜ ik
)−1
+H ′k(R
v
k)
−1Hk + θiQik
]−1
A′k +Q
w
k (23)
with initial condition W˜ i0 = P0.
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For the partial observation case we must also solve the recursions for the past functions of both players.
Solving these recursions yields that the past function for player i has the form
P ik(xk,Wk) =
1
2θi
(
xk − xˆik
)′ (
W˜ ik
)−1(
xk − xˆik
)
+
1
2θi
(zk −Hxk)′ (Rvk)−1 (zk −Hxk) + . . .
(24)
where . . . indicates terms independent of xk.
If θi < 0, then it is necessary that W˜ il + (θiQik)−1 < 0 for l ≤ k.
Corollary 2 The two-person linear-exponential-quadratic dynamic game and with partial observa-
tions without delay, admits a unique feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium solution, if and only
if, (15) and (16) admits a unique solution set {N ik; i = 1, 2, k = 0, 1, . . . , N}, in which case the
equilibrium strategies are
γi
∗
k
(
x˘ik
)
= −N ikx˘ik (25)
where
x˘ik =
[
I + θiW˜ ikM˜
i
k + W˜
i
kH
′
k(R
v
k)
−1Hk
]−1
·
[
xˆik + W˜
i
kH
′
k(R
v
k)
−1zk
] (26)
Proof: As shown in Theorem 2, for the partial observable case, the feedback risk-sensitive Nash
equilibrium is
(
γ1
∗
k (x˘
1
k), γ
2∗
k (x˘
2
k)
)
, where x˘1k and x˘2k are determined by extremizing P ik(xk,Wk) +
F ik(xk) with respect to xk for i = 1 and i = 2 respectively. Substitution of the results of (20) and (24)
yields
P ik(xk,Wk) + F ik(xk) = 12 θ−1i
[(
xk − xˆik
)′ (
W˜ ik
)−1 (
xk − xˆik
)
+(zk −Hkxk)′ (Rvk)−1 (zk −Hkxk)
+θix′kM˜
i
kxk + . . .
]
= 12 θ
−1
i
[
x′k
{(
W˜ ik
)−1 + θiM˜ ik +H ′k(Rvk)−1Hk
}
xk
−2x′k
{(
W˜ ik
)−1
xˆk +H ′k(R
v
k)
−1zk
}
+ . . .
]
.
Extremizing with respect to xk yields x˘ik as in (26). From Corollary 1 we know that γi
∗
k (xk) = −N ikxk
and thus the result follows.
Remark 3: Equations (22) and (23) can be considered as a risk-modified Kalman filter for player i.
The vector xˆik denotes the estimate of xk which θi-extremizes the past function of player i at k. If
in these equations the matrices Qik are zero for k = 0, 1, . . . , N − 1, then they reduce to one set of
equations for both players which is exactly the Kalman filter.
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5 Conclusion
Whereas risk-sensitivity in control theory is well studied in literature, risk-sensitivity in dynamic
games has not been considered before in literature. In this paper results have been presented for
risk-sensitive dynamic games. A two-person linear-quadratic dynamic game in discrete time has been
considered with exponential cost criteria, where the players have different risk-sensitivity parameters.
Nash solutions have been derived under the hypothesis that the strategies at the current time are func-
tions of the observation history up to the current time. This is similar as the hypothesis in Jaensch and
Speyer [5] and Fan et al. [6] for risk-sensitive control. This hypothesis is an extension of the results
of Whittle [3] and [4], who assumes that the control at the current time is a function of the observation
history up to the previous time.
We derived two theorems on feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibria and it is shown that the derivation
leading to these theorems is based on known results of both dynamic game theory and of risk-sensitive
control theory.
In the discrete-time risk-sensitive game, as presented in this paper, the results for the complete ob-
servable risk-sensitive dynamic game are a simple extension of similar results in both dynamic game
theory and risk-sensitive control theory. Even though the results for the complete observation case
are not very difficult to derive, they are important results since they are the basis for the shared partial
observable case. The results for this latter case are less straightforward. It is shown in this paper that
the feedback Nash equilibrium for the partially observable stochastic problem can be constructed from
the feedback risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium design for the complete observable stochastic problem
and from two risk-modified Kalman filters. It turned out that if there are no intermediate state costs
these two filters are identical and exactly the well-known Kalman filter, which is analogous to the
risk-sensitive control situation. However, for the more general case with costs on the intermediate
states, it turned out that for each player one gets a risk-modified Kalman filter.
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